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Behavioural flexibility is essential for everyday life. This involves shifting attention between different 
perspectives. Previous studies suggest that flexibility is mainly subserved by the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC). However, although rarely emphasized, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is frequently 
recruited during flexible behaviour. A crucial question is whether TPJ plays a role in different types of 
flexibility, compared to its limited role in perceptual flexibility. We hypothesized that TPJ activity during 
diverse flexibility tasks plays a common role in stimulus-driven attention-shifting, thereby contributing 
to different types of flexibility, and thus the collaboration between DLPFC and TPJ might serve as a 
more appropriate mechanism than DLPFC alone. We used fMRI to measure DLPFC/TPJ activity recruited 
during moral flexibility, and examined its effect on other domains of flexibility (economic/perceptual). 
Here, we show the additional, yet crucial role of TPJ: a combined DLPFC/TPJ activity predicted 
flexibility, regardless of domain. Different types of flexibility might rely on more basic attention-
shifting, which highlights the behavioural significance of alternatives.
Behavioural flexibility is the ability to adjust one’s goals to face new situations1. This involves shifting attention 
between different perspectives or decision-rules, and thinking about these conflicting perspectives simultane-
ously2. Attention-shifting thus enables viewing incompatible perspectives, thereby adjusting behavioural goals. 
Moreover, evidence has suggested that attention-shifting is not only involved in rapidly adjusting responses, but 
also in selectively maintaining similar responses, because novel changes in a situation can be either favourable 
or unfavourable to the outcomes of one’s decisions3. Therefore, flexibility may best represent a balance between 
maintaining and shifting between decision rules4.
Previous research suggests that behavioural/cognitive flexibility is subserved by a common prefrontal cogni-
tive control system. Specifically, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) supports maintaining current deci-
sion rules to regulate on-line processing, i.e., sustaining goal-directed attention to filter out irrelevant stimuli and 
divert attention from incongruent information5. However, at the same time, the right temporoparietal junction 
(R-TPJ) may support flexibility by shifting between decision rules (shapes and colours) at the perceptual level6. In 
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fact, although rarely emphasized, TPJ is frequently observed during flexible behaviour, together with DLPFC7–9. 
However, the exact role of TPJ, as well as the collaboration between DLPFC and TPJ, have not been sufficiently 
explored.
The question arises: how does the link between DLPFC-TPJ support flexible behaviours? In other words, is 
there a common communication that assists diverse types of flexibility? While it has been proposed that switch-
ing function supports perceptual/visual flexibility by co-activating frontal and parietal regions10, it is unknown 
whether this switching applies to higher-order flexibility (e.g., economic and moral flexibility requiring rule 
switching). Higher-order flexibility has been argued to crucially rely on the cognitive system within PFC that 
subserves broad set-shifting of perspectives/decision-strategies, and strong top-down biasing for conflict reduc-
tion1, 11. Incidentally, while TPJ’s subdivisions may subserve distinct functions such as attention-shifting and 
mentalizing12–14, recent meta-analyses have argued for overlapping functions within TPJ, and have speculated 
about a more general function in social processing15, 16. In this respect, we were interested in the shared role of 
TPJ that may provide a more plausible mechanistic explanation. We hypothesized that TPJ activity during diverse 
flexibility tasks plays a common role in stimulus driven attention-shifting, thereby contributing to different types 
of flexibility, and thus the collaboration between DLPFC and TPJ might serve as a more appropriate mechanism 
than DLPFC alone.
We studied the mediating effect of R-TPJ activity on the relationship between R-DLPFC activity and flexi-
bility across three distinct domains (moral, economic, and perceptual), which are all involved in thinking about 
conflicting perspectives simultaneously2. We measured flexibility when subjects adopted alternative perspectives 
(i.e., profit/welfare maximization for moral and economic flexibility via considering their conflicting dilemmas). 
That is to say, moral flexibility was measured by change rates (CR) during a moral-dilemma (MD) task. One CR 
meant that subjects chose ‘wrong’ when they evaluated whether moral actions were right or wrong (R/W), but 
flexibly changed to ‘yes’ when they evaluated whether they would or would not conduct the same actions via 
cost-benefit (C/B) considerations through attention-shifting17. Thus, R/W represented subjects’ simple evalu-
ations of whether situations were morally right or wrong, while C/B represented evaluations of how subjects 
would act in the real world by thinking about these perspectives simultaneously (R/W and C/B), which required 
greater flexibility. More specifically, C/B primarily induced the moral dilemma: 1) right or wrong perspectives 
to follow the social norm (rule-based); and 2) cost or benefit perspectives to focus on the consequence of moral 
violation (result-oriented)17. As a result, thinking of conducting such moral violation involved flexible switching 
of these conflicting perspectives simultaneously, prompting potential shifting to alternative decision choice for 
welfare maximization17. Indeed, flexible or less rigid people are more likely to take result-oriented options18. 
Moral scenarios were designed so that subjects would feel that the scenarios were morally ‘wrong’, but that it 
was still potentially acceptable to conduct these actions. We thus manipulated the behavioural significance of 
alternatives by changing the scenarios’ context. The economic flexibility was measured by the acceptance rates 
(AR) of unfair offers during the Ultimatum Game (UG). Similar to MD, UG induced an economic dilemma: 1) 
fairness-oriented perspective (to focus on norm violations); and 2) result-based perspective (to focus on mone-
tary reward)19. In effect, accepting unfair offers involved flexible switching of these conflicting perspectives simul-
taneously, which allows shifting towards alternative decisional options. Accordingly, people with more flexibility 
(or less rigidity), tend to behave capably and opportunistically in UG, being good at playing this game while 
pursuing self-interest20, 21. Faced with unfairness, subjects were inclined to reject unfair offers, but sometimes 
they strategically and flexibly accepted them in consideration of maximizing financial gains, which is the ultimate 
goal of the game21. Furthermore, perceptual flexibility was measured by the number of categories achieved (CA) 
during the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), which is a well-established task for measuring behavioural 
flexibility in terms of attention set-shifting9.
Results
Relationship between the level of flexible behaviour and the strength of brain activity. 
Behavioural results showed that mean CR, AR, and CA among subjects were: 27.3 ± 15.7%, 41.3 ± 39.9%, and 
4.6 ± 1.5, respectively. To study brain activity supporting behavioural flexibility, we examined the conflict res-
olution contrast (C/B > R/W). In whole-brain analysis, this contrast revealed activity in R-DLPFC and R-TPJ 
(p < 0.01, cluster-level family-wise error (FWE) corrected; Supplementary Table S1). Besides the above prede-
fined ROIs, significant brain activities were also observed in the region, including primary visual area, cingulate 
cortex, frontal and temporal lobe, and cerebellum, at a corrected level for multiple comparisons across the entire 
brain. However, because these results are beyond the scope of our current study, further analyses are focused on 
our a priori ROIs. Meanwhile, no significant brain activity was detected in the reverse contrast (R/W > C/B). 
In the subsequent ROI analysis, we also observed activity in R-DLPFC and R-TPJ (Supplementary Table S2). 
Using the parameter estimates of these ROIs, R-DLPFC activity correlated positively with R-TPJ activity (r = 0.42, 
p = 0.019), and also correlated positively with: 1) CR (r = 0.40, p = 0.026); 2) AR (r = 0.49, p = 0.008); and 3) 
CA (r = 0.37, p = 0.039). Likewise, R-TPJ activity correlated positively with: 1) CR (r = 0.38, p = 0.033); 2) AR 
(r = 0.49, p = 0.007); and 3) CA (r = 0.50, p = 0.008).
Mediation analysis. Subsequently, we constructed three mediation models, given the documented role 
of DLPFC in attention maintenance5, 22 and the proposed role of TPJ in collaborating with DLPFC to sup-
port attention-shifting10, 23. The results showed that R-TPJ activity was a statistically effective mediator of the 
relationship between R-DLPFC activity and flexibility across all three domains (moral, economic, perceptual; 
Fig. 1a–c). There were significant indirect effects on the relationship between R-DLPFC and behavioural flex-
ibility (bias-corrected/accelerated, bootstrap 5000; 95% confidence intervals: 0.01–0.31, 0.02–0.36, and 0.07–
0.49, respectively). Finally, by averaging the normalized scores of flexibility measures across the three domains 
(i.e., composited score), there was a statistically significant indirect effect of R-TPJ on the relationship between 
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R-DLPFC and this composited score (bias-corrected/accelerated, bootstrap 5000; 95% confidence intervals: 
0.10–0.51).
As an additional analysis, we examined the functional connectivity between R-TPJ and R-DLPFC using psy-
chophysiological interaction analysis (PPI). The results showed that there was a link between the strength of 
R-TPJ activity and R-DLPFC activity in the conflict resolution contrast [(i.e., C/B > R/W; p < 0.01, cluster-level 
Figure 1. Mediation model for (a) moral, (b) economic, and (c) perceptual domains. R-TPJ was an effective 
mediator across all domains; there were significant indirect effects on the relationship between R-DLPFC 
and behavioural flexibility. ‘B’ denotes regression coefficients, indicating each link in the model. Confidence 
intervals (CIs) not including zero indicate indirect effects (p < 0.05).
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corrected (Monte Carlo simulations24); Supplementary Table S3]. Details are described in the Supplementary 
Results.
Discussion
We found that TPJ activity not only mediates the relationship between DLPFC activity and moral flexibility dur-
ing the MD task, but also the relationship between DLPFC activity and other domains of flexibility outside the 
MRI scanner. In consideration of the established function of TPJ, a key mechanism underlying the link between 
TPJ activity during a specific task (moral reasoning) that requires higher-order flexibility and lower-order flexibil-
ity (perceptual) might be due to basic attention-shifting14, 25, 26. Further, TPJ mediated DLPFC and the composited 
score of flexibility (moral, economic, and perceptual). The collaboration between DLPFC and TPJ might extend 
across two different types of higher-order flexibility (moral and economic), and this would also support previ-
ous findings for its role in lower-order flexibility10. One possible interpretation is that such switching represents 
adjusted attention-shifting: one partly shifts/disengages attention from current decision-rules and explores the 
significance of alternative choices27, thereby updating decision-rules/strategies. DLPFC might send endogenous 
signals28 to modulate TPJ during adaptive disengagement from a current attention-set, which in turn enables TPJ 
to explore/highlight alternative choices to optimize decision-rules29, 30.
The brain activity observed in the conflict resolution contrast supported previous studies regarding flexible 
behaviours. Our current study observed activity within: prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, parietal lobe, in 
addition to our ROIs (DLPFC and TPJ). Activity including posterior cingulate, superior/middle frontal gyrus, 
and inferior parietal lobule7 had been reported during result-focused flexible decision during MD (cognitive 
conflict and control)7. In addition, according to a review on MD, bilateral DLPFC (Brodmann area/BA 46) and 
bilateral TPJ/STS (BA 39/22) activities were observed during moral resolution contrast31; and distinctive R-TPJ 
activity (BA 39/40) was also reported7, 32. In UG, such value-based decision20 was related to DLPFC8 and cin-
gulate cortex33, which may regulate the emotional response in favour of more flexible decision-making34. More 
specifically, activity including DLPFC (BA 46/9) and bilateral posterior TPJ (BA 39)35 were reported in the unfair-
ness > fairness contrast in UG19. Likewise, attention set-shifting tasks36, 37 including WCST involved executive 
functioning subserved by DLPFC, cingulate cortex, and superior/inferior parietal lobule9, which may support 
conflict-induced behavioural adjustment38. Further, these activities in the prefrontal and parietal regions also 
support the theory concerning the ventral attention reorienting network13, 23, 39, 40. In this line, previous studies on 
WCST in particular, reported activities including mid-DLPFC (BA 46/9) and anterior-TPJ (BA40)9, 36, 41.
The role of attention-shifting in flexibility might apply to the spatial/perceptual domain, as well as to other 
domains. Indeed, an imbalance between maintaining and shifting between decision rules may induce different 
types of cognitive inflexibility, such as perseveration (maladaptive focusing on or revisiting particular informa-
tion) and spatial neglect, of which R-TPJ is the most common substrate42, 43. Patients with spatial-neglect are 
capable of seeing all items in a scene, but have difficulty appropriately allocating attention to these items. In addi-
tion, these patients have attentional impairments in non-spatial domains43. Neglect syndrome has been ascribed 
to difficulties in attention allocation in broader domains, such as shifting attention from an external information 
source to one’s internal on-line presentation or detecting behavioural-significance42. In this respect, cognitive 
‘inflexibility’ can be regarded as a phenomenon akin to spatial-neglect, whereby one might ignore alternative per-
spectives/choices due to maladaptive attention allocation, in a manner of cognitive-neglect or mind-blindness44. 
Mind-blindness is a hallmark of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which is also characterized by atypical R-TPJ 
functioning and frontoparietal integration43, 45. Intriguingly, ASD also shows a broad range of behavioural/cogni-
tive inflexibility, and mind-blindness is linked to impaired spontaneous detection of behavioural-significance46.
As an additional analysis, we examined functional connectivity between R-TPJ and R-DLPFC using PPI anal-
ysis. The result was in accordance with the discussion stated above. Namely, there was a link between the strength 
of R-TPJ activity and R-DLPFC activity in the conflict resolution contrast [(C/B > R/W); see Supplementary 
Results and discussion]. However, the threshold of this result is relatively liberal for arguing robustly about the 
link between TPJ and DLPFC. Thus, additional experiments especially focusing on the interaction between TPJ 
and DLPFC should be conducted.
To confirm our interpretation of the results, future research should also examine TPJ activity recruited 
across each of the three domains of flexibility studied here (compared to investigating brain activity during 
moral flexibility only and correlating this activity with multiple types of flexible behaviour outside the scanner). 
Nevertheless, as we hypothesized, the role of TPJ in attention-shifting might be the most plausible candidate to 
explain our findings (mediation effects of TPJ observed in the three flexible domains). In fact, it would be difficult 
to interpret our findings by other domain-specific cognitive functions, that is, the association between TPJ activ-
ity during moral flexibility and the level of perceptual or economic flexibility outside the scanner.
In this view, our interpretation of such functional causality is highly speculative, as there are several con-
founding factors. For example, individuals’ level of behavioural flexibility could be influenced by their level of 
cognitive/emotional intelligence, social/empathic skill, age, and gender47–49. They may have various impacts on 
different domains of flexibility. Thus, caution should be taken concerning the overgeneralization of behavioural 
flexibility. Therefore, given such a preliminary nature of the study, we suggest that a future study should take 
these confounding factors more strictly into account. In addition, more studies are certainly required for robustly 
replicating the possible link between the individuals’ skill of different flexibility and strength of brain activity, for 
which we found modest levels of these relationships.
Our findings suggest that focusing on lower-level attention-shifting might provide new avenues towards gain-
ing a better understanding of behavioural flexibility, given that optimal levels of arousal and social motivation are 
conducive to flexible behaviour50. Behavioural flexibility might rely on more basic attention-shifting that helps the 
adoption of different domains of ‘perspectives’.
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Methods
Subjects. Twenty-four students participated in the study (7 females, mean age = 21.3 ± 1.2 years). Exclusion 
criteria included a history of neurological injury or disease, serious medical/surgical illness, and substance abuse. 
The subjects did not meet criteria for psychiatric disorders as measured by the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID I). All subjects provided informed written consent and were compensated for 
their participation. This study was approved by the Committee on Medical Ethics of Kyoto University and carried 
out in accordance with The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association.
Moral Dilemma task (MD). The subjects first underwent an MRI scan during the MD task. MD is a 
well-established measure that manipulates conflicts between concerns for personal welfare and concerns for 
others’ welfare, thereby enabling the observation of moral flexibility51 via attention-shifting17. MD was a block 
design task that included a set of 40 moral and 20 non-moral (control) scenarios. Moral scenarios were designed 
so that the subjects would feel that the scenarios were morally wrong, but that it was potentially acceptable to 
conduct the action in real life. MD included 15 blocks (24 sec each). Each block included four trials (6 sec each), 
where subjects viewed short phrases representing each scenario. The subjects read each scenario silently, imag-
ining that they were the protagonist. For moral scenarios, the subjects were instructed to press a button to either 
evaluate: 1) whether the action was morally right or wrong (R/W condition; 5 blocks), or 2) whether or not 
they would actually conduct the action in real life, considering the costs and benefits of each action (C/B condi-
tion; 5 blocks), in addition to R/W. For non-moral scenarios, they were instructed to press a button to evaluate 
whether or not (yes/no) they agreed with each statement (Y/N condition; 5 blocks). Further, a fixation cross 
was displayed between respective blocks for 14 sec. Therefore, in this task, the subjects were always evaluated by 
the same scenarios twice (R/W and C/B). To avoid a confound effect, these R/W, C/B, and Y/N conditions were 
displayed in a pseudo-random order, that is, exactly the same order of questions for every subject. Specifically, 
while three blocks of moral scenarios were displayed with R/W evaluation first (before C/B), two blocks of moral 
scenarios were displayed with C/B evaluation first (before R/W). To investigate brain patterns during flexible 
decision-making, we examined the brain regions activated more strongly in C/B compared to R/W (i.e., conflict 
resolution contrast). After MRI scanning, a post-scan rating interview was performed; the subjects were shown 
the same stimuli (i.e., 60 stimuli in total) and instructed to use a 7-point Likert scale to rate the level of conflict 
they felt (1 = ‘felt no sense of conflict at all’, 7 = ‘felt extreme sense of conflict’). Sense-of-conflict scores were used 
in the other analyses that will be reported elsewhere.
Ultimatum Game (UG). The subjects completed UG and WCST outside the MRI scanner. UG is a 
well-established measure that manipulates conflicts between financial interests and fairness/justice inter-
ests, thereby enabling the observation of economic flexibility52. The subjects played the role of responder in a 
two-person UG against an anonymous, computerized proposer (age- and gender-matched imaginary subject). 
In this computer task, the proposer offered to split a sum of ten coins (i.e., 100 Japanese yen with one coin corre-
sponding to 10 Japanese yen, or approximately 0.10 US dollars) with the subject (i.e., responder). The subject was 
told that if he/she accepted the offer, both the proposer and the responder would be paid accordingly, but if the 
subject rejected the offer, neither the proposer nor the responder would receive any payment. Subsequently, we 
calculated the subjects’ acceptance rates (AR) for fair and unfair offers. In the current study, we only examined AR 
of unfair offers. In the manner of previous studies, each trial was performed with a new proposer to avoid learning 
and reputation effects53, and only the first names of the responders (subjects) and the proposers were displayed on 
the computer screen to ensure anonymity. In addition, before the experimental session, participants practiced the 
task until they understood it thoroughly, and they were also given the explanation that the offers of the proposers 
had been obtained in an earlier part of the study by other real subjects who participated in another experiment33. 
The subjects were also informed that at the end of the task, the computer would randomly select three trials and 
compute their earnings, and these payments would be added to their final compensation. In reality, all subjects 
received the maximum earnings.
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). WCST is a well-established measure for cognitive/perceptual flex-
ibility, which assesses the ability to shift attentional sets across various perceptual categories. The current study 
adopted a computerized version of WCST54. In this test, we focused on the number of categories achieved (CA), 
which represented a perceptual domain of flexibility. One CA represented one rule attainment counted by 6 con-
secutive correct selections after the rule changes. Therefore, larger CAs represent greater flexible decision-making 
within the perceptual domain5. Note that WCST data of one subject was omitted because of a technical error.
fMRI data acquisition, preprocessing & analysis. All subjects completed an MRI scan with a 3-T scan-
ner (Verio, Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a 32-channel phased-array head coil. Functional images 
were obtained using a T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following parameters: 
TE/TR: 25/2000 ms, flip angle = 75°, field of view (FOV) = 224 × 224 mm, 34 interleaved axial slices without gaps, 
resolution = 3.5 mm cubic voxels. To allow for signal stabilization, the first two volumes were not saved, but the 
subsequent 292 volumes were then acquired. To reduce image distortions and signal loss caused by susceptibility 
gradients in the orbitofrontal cortex, we used a tilted acquisition to the AC-PC line. This method optimized the 
imaging slice orientation55. Each subject lay supine on a scanner bed, with a button-response device held in the 
right hand. MRI-compatible glasses were used to correct the vision of subjects with poor eyesight, and foam 
padding was used to reduce head motion. Visual stimuli were back-projected onto a screen through a built-in 
mirror in the scanner bore. Imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM 8 (Statistical Parametric 
Mapping: Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Functional images were corrected 
for differences in slice-acquisition timing and then spatially realigned to correct for head motion. Realigned 
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images were spatially normalized to fit the EPI template supplied by SPM 8. These images were resampled into 
2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxels during the normalization process. All EPI images were smoothed using a Gaussian 
kernel with full-width at half-maximum of 8 mm in the x, y, and z-axes to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. 
Time-series data were high-pass filtered at 128 s to remove low frequency drifts.
General linear model. After pre-processing, a separate general linear model was constructed for each sub-
ject. We fitted a general linear model (GLM)56 to the fMRI data. In the first-level analyses, the design matrix 
included the R/W, C/B, and Y/N conditions, in addition to the task-instruction periods. We also included the six 
movement parameters (three displacements and three rotations) to minimize motion-related artifacts as regres-
sors of no interest. The conflict resolution contrast was identified as the difference between the C/B and R/W 
conditions (C/B > R/W). These single subject contrasts were used for the second-level fMRI analyses. Specifically, 
in this second-level analyses, main effects of conflict resolution were calculated by one-sample t-tests using a 
random-effects model.
Whole-brain group analysis. We conducted whole-volume voxel-wise analysis. The statistical threshold 
was defined at cluster-level of p < 0.01 with a family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons (at 
voxel-level uncorrected p < 0.001). We interpreted the anatomical location of the clusters by consulting neu-
roanatomy atlas books, MRIcron (http://people.cas.sc.edu/rorden/mricron/index.html), and SPM8 extension 
XjView (http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview).
Region of interest analysis. Based on our literature-based hypothesis, we then performed a priori region of 
interest (ROI) analyses to further determine whether neural activity within both of our predefined relevant brain 
regions (i.e., R-DLPFC and R-TPJ) respond with regard to conflict-resolution effect (C/B > R/W). R-TPJ and 
R-DLPFC ROIs were limited to the right hemisphere to study intra-hemispheric relationships. This was because 
the right hemisphere has been the one most frequently involved in the ventral attention orienting network13, 23, 39 
as well as in social cognition16, 57. Based on a previous study58, using the Wake Forest University (WFU) PickAtlas 
toolbox59, we applied a mask including the right BA 46 for R-DLPFC ROI, and a standard 10-mm sphere mask60, 61  
for R-TPJ ROI [x-y-z Talairach coordinates (+50, − 55, 25)] obtained in the meta-analysis for mentalizing system 
involving perspective shifting towards other individuals via attention orientation62, 63. This procedure was based 
on ROI-reporting policies64, suggesting that while it is possible to take the stereotactic coordinates from an acti-
vation in a single/localizer study and place an ROI at that location, it is also recommendable to derive a ROI from 
meta-analyses. We defined activity as significant if it survived family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple 
comparisons, with a cluster-level of p < 0.01 (at voxel-level uncorrected p < 0.001), in accordance with previous 
ROI studies65. The parameter estimates were extracted as first eigenvariates from the significant clusters within 
these ROIs, and these were used for the following analyses consistently. The VOI function in SPM8 was used to 
extract the parameter estimates from the significant clusters.
Mediation analyses. The mediation effect was tested using SPSS macro ‘Indirect66’, which examines whether 
an independent variable impacts a dependent variable through mediators. We tested the significance of the medi-
ation effect by bootstrapping strategy within this macro. This bootstrapping method repeatedly extracts samples 
from the dataset and estimates the mediation effect in each resampled dataset. Rather than providing conven-
tional p values, this resampling method constructs an approximation of the sampling distribution and constructs 
confidence intervals. Using this model, if a confidence interval does not contain zero, then the mediated effect 
is considered significant66. While the minimum recommended number of samples to extract using this boot-
strapping is 1000, we applied 5000 samples to obtain more robust confidence intervals. Moreover, we applied this 
statistical test with the strictest threshold using ‘bias-corrected/accelerated confidence intervals’. Furthermore, 
we calculated a composite score of the behavioural flexibility measures of three domains (moral, economic, and 
perceptual) by averaging the normalized scores. Subsequently, we conducted mediation analysis using this com-
posite score.
PPI analysis. As an additional analysis, we examined functional connectivity between R-TPJ and R-DLPFC 
using psychophysiological interaction analysis67. Details are described in the Supplementary Methods.
For more detail of Methods, see Supplementary information.
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